The behaviour of ideational apraxic patients on simple tasks involving multiple objects is typically marked by a variety of errors. While some of these errors concern the sequential organisation of action through time, many relate to the misuse of, or failure to use, necessary or appropriate tools. In this paper we apply the computational model of Cooper and Shallice (2000) to five standard multiple object tasks used in clinical assessment and demonstrate how, when lesioned, the model can account for the error profiles of two ideational apraxic patients discussed by Rumiati et al. (2001). Application of the model to the multiple object tasks demonstrates the generality of the model, while the account of the error profiles extends previous work (Cooper et al., 2005) in which ideational apraxia was argued to arise from a generalised disturbance of object representations that are held to trigger action schemas.
INTRODUCTION
Failures in the performance of simple tasks involving multiple objects, such as lighting a candle or juicing an orange, have frequently been reported following neural injury. These failures often involve the repetition or omission of key steps in the tasks, together with misuse of and/or failure to use necessary or appropriate tools. Thus, when lighting a candle a patient who is prone to such errors might fail to strike the match before bringing it towards the wick of the candle, or even attempt to strike the match against the candle instead of against the side of the matchbox. Such errors have been attributed to a variety of causes, both at the anatomical level and the cognitive level. Thus, Luria (1966) , who observed action errors in patients with bilateral frontal lesions, suggested that the errors arose from "the gross disintegration of the "preliminary synthesis" of intended actions and […] disturbances of the process of comparison of intention and effect" (p. 238). He referred to the deficit as frontal apraxia. De Renzi and Lucchelli (1988) , on the other hand, observed similar errors in patients with predominately left temporoparietal lesions, and suggested that they arose from a deficit in the retrieval of object-related knowledge, and in particular from "a lack of access to a specific aspect of the semantic store" (p. 1183). De Renzi and Lucchelli's (1988) work was framed within the context of ideational apraxia originating with Pick (1905) and Liepmann (1920) . More recently, Schwartz et al. (1991 , 1995 , 1998 Schwartz et al., 1999; and dementia patients: Giovannetti et al., 2002) . On the basis of this, Schwartz et al. (1998) argued that action disorganisation following neural injury arises from a general inability to sustain the cognitive resources necessary for the performance of naturalistic activities. An alternative account, however, for the similarities in error profiles may be developed by assuming that behaviour is the product of multiple interacting systems, where the interactions are such that damage to different systems may, at least on the kinds of naturalistic tasks explored by Schwartz and colleagues (Schwartz et al., 1998 (Schwartz et al., , 1999 Buxbaum et al., 1998; Giovannetti et al., 2002) , result in similar behavioural disorders. Hartmann et al. (2005) have provided evidence for such an account by demonstrating that while two groups of patients with left and right brain damage did not differ on the performance of two naturalistic tasks (preparing filter coffee and assembling a tape recorder), they Cortex, (2007) 43, [319] [320] [321] [322] [323] [324] [325] [326] [327] [328] [329] [330] [331] [332] [333] [334] [335] [336] [337] 
